At its peak, Circuit City operated over 700 stores, employed 60,000 people, and generated $12 billion in annual revenue. By March 2009, every single location was permanently closed.
What happened to Circuit City is one of retail’s most studied collapses. A company that pioneered the consumer electronics superstore format simply stopped adapting while Best Buy, Amazon, and changing consumer behavior moved on without it.
This article covers the full story: the strategic failures, the financial deterioration, the 2008 bankruptcy filing, and what ultimately became of the brand, the real estate, and the 35,000 workers left behind.
What Was Circuit City?
Circuit City was an American consumer electronics retailer founded in 1949 by Samuel S. Wurtzel as the Wards Company, a small television shop on West Broad Street in Richmond, Virginia. The company pioneered the electronics superstore format and grew into one of the most recognized retail brands in the U.S.
At its peak in the early 2000s, Circuit City operated more than 700 stores and generated annual sales exceeding $12 billion, making it the second-largest consumer electronics chain in the country (Grokipedia).
| Milestone | Year | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Founded as Wards Company | 1949 | Richmond, Virginia television store |
| Rebranded to Circuit City | 1977 | First Circuit City showrooms in Washington D.C. |
| NYSE listing | 1984 | Ticker symbol: CC |
| Peak employment | 2000 | 616 U.S. stores, 60,000 employees |
| Bankruptcy filed | November 10, 2008 | Chapter 11, Richmond, Virginia court |
How the Brand Started
Wurtzel got the idea for the business in 1949 while on vacation in Richmond, after a local barber told him the first commercial television station in the South was about to launch. He moved his family there and opened the store. The name “Wards” was an acronym of his family’s names: W for Wurtzel, A for his son Alan, R for his wife Ruth, D for his son David, and S for Samuel.
By 1959, the company operated 4 stores with roughly $1 million in annual sales (Encyclopedia.com). His son Alan joined in 1966 and helped build it into a national chain.
What Circuit City Sold
Core product categories at peak:
- Consumer electronics: televisions, audio equipment, home theater systems
- Home appliances (until 1999)
- Personal computers and computer peripherals
- Car audio and installation services
The company differentiated itself early through knowledgeable in-store staff and a commission-based sales model. That model would later become a source of structural tension as competition intensified.
When Did Circuit City Start Losing Ground to Best Buy?
Circuit City began losing market share to Best Buy in the mid-1990s, when Best Buy introduced a commission-free, warehouse-style retail model that undercut Circuit City on price and store experience. By 1996, Best Buy held 8.7 percent of the consumer electronics market, just 0.1 percent behind Circuit City (Encyclopedia.com).
The gap widened fast after that. Best Buy passed Circuit City in consumer electronics leadership by 1996 and never looked back (Harvard Business School).
The Commission-Free Advantage
Best Buy’s Concept II stores, introduced in 1989, eliminated sales commissions entirely. Products were displayed on the floor with visible pricing, and customers could shop without pressure. Circuit City kept its commission model far longer, which increased payroll costs and created inconsistent customer experiences across stores.
Circuit City’s own employees noted the tension: when the company eliminated commissions in the early 2000s without replacing the incentive structure, floor staff had little motivation to sell. This hurt conversion rates during a period when Best Buy was aggressively expanding.
The Appliance Exit Decision
Circuit City stopped selling home appliances in 1999 and 2000. At the time, management framed it as a strategic focus on higher-margin electronics. In practice, it removed a profitable revenue category worth hundreds of millions in annual sales.
Home Depot and Lowe’s absorbed that appliance business. Circuit City gave up the category with no real plan for replacing the revenue or foot traffic it generated. This decision is widely cited as one of the most damaging strategic calls in the company’s history (Time, 2008).
Store Location and Format Gaps
Best Buy consistently secured better real estate. Its large-format Concept III stores, running 45,000 to 58,000 square feet, gave customers a broader product selection and more hands-on displays. Circuit City’s store footprints were often smaller and located in less convenient spots.
Time magazine analysts noted in 2008 that Circuit City’s out-of-the-way locations were “often just inconvenient enough to tempt customers to head to other retailers.” Once Walmart began stocking consumer electronics at discount prices, the location disadvantage compounded further.
What Financial Problems Did Circuit City Have?
Circuit City’s financial deterioration predated the 2008 recession by several years. The company reported a $54.6 million first-quarter loss in fiscal 2007 and withdrew its full-year financial guidance, citing continued volatility from restructuring and competitive pressure (NBC News, 2007).
By mid-2008, cash and short-term investments had dropped from $297.4 million to just $92.5 million in six months, while borrowings under the company’s credit facility jumped from $0 to $215 million over the same period (Circuit City 10-Q, SEC, 2008).
Declining Same-Store Sales
Same-store sales fell 5.6 percent in the first quarter of fiscal 2007, a sharp reversal from the prior year when same-store sales had grown nearly 15 percent (NBC News, 2007).
That swing reflects how quickly the company’s retail fundamentals unraveled. A business that had been growing double digits was suddenly shrinking, and management had no clear plan to reverse it.
Gross Margin Collapse
Flat-panel TV price wars destroyed Circuit City’s margins. The company cut prices on televisions and computers during the 2006 holiday season to compete with Best Buy and Walmart. Sales volume increased, but at a loss. Sanford C. Bernstein analyst Colin McGranahan called the gross margin situation “very concerning” after the Q3 2006 results (NBC News, 2006).
Circuit City owed $118 million to Hewlett-Packard, $116 million to Samsung, and $60 million to Sony at the time of its bankruptcy filing. Those vendor balances reflected how deeply the company had leveraged itself against future sales that never materialized (Time, 2008).
Losses Across Six Consecutive Quarters
Circuit City lost money in 5 of its last 6 quarters before filing for bankruptcy (CNBC, 2008).
That consistent pattern of losses signals something more than cyclical pressure. It points to a structurally broken business model. Management knew this. CEO Philip Schoonover publicly stated in 2007 that the issues were “primarily self-induced.”
| Period | Financial Result | Key Driver |
|---|---|---|
| Q3 FY2006 | $16 million loss | Flat-panel TV margin squeeze |
| Q1 FY2007 | $54.6 million loss | Same-store sales decline of 5.6% |
| Q3 FY2008 | $239 million loss | Restructuring costs, low warranty sales |
| H1 FY2009 | $404 million loss | Asset impairment charges of $73 million |
Why Did Circuit City Fire 3,400 of Its Highest-Paid Workers?
On March 28, 2007, Circuit City terminated 3,400 in-store employees, representing about 9 percent of its store workforce of 40,000. The company stated publicly that these workers were earning “well above the market-based salary range for their role” and would be replaced with lower-paid new hires (Washington Post, 2007).
Workers were notified in morning meetings and escorted out of stores the same day. They received four weeks of severance pay and were told they could reapply for their old jobs after a 10-week waiting period, at reduced wages.
Who Was Fired and Why It Mattered
The company was not cutting underperformers. Circuit City was specifically targeting experienced workers whose years of service had pushed their wages above the local market average. One worker told the Washington Post he had been at the company for 7 years and earned $11.59 per hour. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics pegged the average hourly wage for retail salespeople at $11.14 at the time.
That margin is thin. The company fired experienced, product-knowledgeable staff to save roughly 45 cents per hour per worker. Meanwhile, CEO Philip Schoonover received a salary of $716,346 plus a $704,700 bonus that same year (Washington Post, 2007).
What Happened to Store Service Quality
The cuts had an immediate visible effect on the floor. A Verizon Wireless employee working from a kiosk inside a Circuit City in Virginia told NBC News: “The Circuit City customers were wandering around and would start asking us for help. That’s what I’ve witnessed and I hate about the whole situation.”
Many of the replacement hires were teenagers with no sales experience. The company’s job listing language explicitly noted that applicants “need have no sales experience.” For a retailer selling complex electronics to customers who needed guidance, this was a critical mistake. Consumer electronics retail depends on trust. That trust requires knowledgeable staff. Circuit City traded it for short-term cost savings that, as later quarters showed, did nothing to reverse the financial slide.
Stock Market Reaction vs. Long-Term Reality
Shares rose 2 percent to $19.23 on the day the firings were announced (WSWS, 2007). That reaction reflects how differently Wall Street and retail operators read the move. Investors saw cost-cutting. Store managers saw the loss of their most capable people. Both were right about what happened next: the stock collapsed to $3.47 within a year (einvestingforbeginners.com).
How Did the 2008 Financial Crisis Accelerate Circuit City’s Collapse?
Circuit City entered 2008 already financially weakened, with months of consecutive losses and thinning cash reserves. The financial crisis accelerated a collapse that was already in motion. It did not cause it.
By August 2008, Circuit City’s cash had dropped to $92.5 million from $297.4 million just six months earlier. Borrowings under its credit facility had jumped from $0 to $215 million in the same period (SEC, 2008).
Vendor Credit Tightening
Suppliers pinched by the global credit crunch began requiring up-front payments before shipping goods to Circuit City. For a retailer that depended on vendor credit to stock its shelves ahead of the holiday season, this was catastrophic.
Three factors cited by CFO Bruce Besanko in the bankruptcy filing:
- Erosion of vendor confidence
- Decreased liquidity
- Global economic crisis (CNBC, 2008)
Circuit City still owed $118 million to HP, $116 million to Samsung, and $60 million to Sony. With those balances unpaid and new terms tightening, restocking for the holidays was nearly impossible without access to capital.
Consumer Spending Collapse
Consumer electronics spending dropped sharply in late 2008. For a retailer without a recurring revenue stream, a strong services business, or meaningful e-commerce sales, the drop hit everything at once.
Best Buy entered the same recession with stronger cash reserves and better-optimized operations. Their inventory was well-managed. Circuit City’s distribution systems were lagging, items were frequently out of stock, and store layouts were outdated (Headcount Coffee, 2026). There was no buffer when spending fell.
CompUSA as a Warning Sign
CompUSA, another consumer electronics chain, had already collapsed in 2007. That should have been a clear signal about the structural fragility of mid-tier electronics retail. Circuit City management did not adjust course in time.
The difference was speed of response. Best Buy had already acquired Geek Squad in 2002, added service-based revenue, and built e-commerce capacity. Circuit City’s digital presence launched years behind Amazon and Best Buy. By 2008, it was too late to close that gap.
What Happened During the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Process?
Circuit City filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on November 10, 2008, alongside 17 affiliated entities, in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Richmond, Virginia. At filing, the company employed 34,000 people across 567 locations and generated $11.6 billion in annual revenue (tms-outsource.com).
The filing came one week after Circuit City announced it would close 155 stores and cut 17 percent of its U.S. workforce. Circuit City became the largest U.S. retailer to file for Chapter 11 since Kmart in 2002 (Reuters, 2008).
What Offers Did Circuit City Receive During Bankruptcy?
The company secured $1.1 billion in debtor-in-possession financing from Bank of America to continue operating during bankruptcy proceedings (CNBC, 2008). Systemax submitted a bid focused on the brand name and online assets. Other private equity groups explored partial store acquisitions. No buyer offered enough to cover going-concern operations and satisfy creditors.
Key bidders and outcomes:
- Systemax: Acquired brand name and CircuitCity.com domain
- InterTAN (Canadian subsidiary): Sold separately to Bell Canada in 2009
- Store locations: Leases absorbed by Best Buy, Target, and regional retailers
- Liquidation managers: Great American Group and Gordon Brothers Group
Why Did the Liquidation Happen Instead of a Sale?
The reorganization plan collapsed in January 2009. No viable acquirer emerged at terms that could satisfy the company’s creditors while keeping the business operating. The math did not work: Circuit City’s debt load was too large, its operations too unprofitable, and consumer confidence too low for any buyer to see a path to recovery.
Court approval for full liquidation came in January 2009. All 567 remaining stores closed by March 8, 2009. The liquidation displaced more than 30,000 workers and represented one of the largest retail closures of the post-2008 recession period.
Who Tried to Buy Circuit City?
Several parties explored buying Circuit City during the bankruptcy process. None succeeded in acquiring the operating business. The reasons varied, but most came down to the same core problem: the retail operation was not viable at any price that covered existing liabilities.
Systemax and the Brand Acquisition
Systemax, an online electronics retailer, acquired the Circuit City brand name and the CircuitCity.com domain after the bankruptcy. The site relaunched briefly as an online retailer. Systemax later sold the brand rights, and in 2016 Ronny Shmoel acquired the name and re-established Circuit City Corporation as a separate entity. The brand changed hands multiple times between 2009 and 2016 without returning to meaningful retail scale.
Why Major Retailers Passed
Best Buy did not submit a bid for Circuit City’s store portfolio. Neither did Walmart or any other major electronics retailer. This matters. It signals that industry insiders, with full visibility into Circuit City’s operations, concluded the stores were not worth acquiring as going concerns.
What made acquisition unattractive:
- Unprofitable store base with high lease obligations
- Damaged brand perception and lost customer trust after the 2007 layoffs
- Weak e-commerce infrastructure with no competitive position
- Vendor relationships already broken by unpaid balances
Best Buy’s decision to absorb some Circuit City store leases post-liquidation, rather than acquire the business, tells the story clearly. The real estate had value. The operating company did not. This is also a useful case study in how retail brand equity can erode faster than balance sheets suggest. Circuit City looked financially stable by simple debt metrics in 2008, but the underlying business had been hollowing out for a decade.
For anyone studying failed startups and corporate collapses, the Circuit City case is particularly instructive because the collapse was not sudden. It was the cumulative result of years of compounding strategic errors with no meaningful course corrections.
What Role Did Leadership and Strategy Failures Play?
Bad management was the root cause of Circuit City’s collapse, not the 2008 recession. Time magazine analyst Anita Hamilton put it plainly in 2008: “The real culprit is good old-fashioned bad management” (NPR, 2008).
The company posted the worst annual results in its history under CEO Philip Schoonover, losing more than $300 million in his final full fiscal year (Washington Post, 2008).
Philip Schoonover’s Tenure
Schoonover joined Circuit City in 2004 from Best Buy, where he was executive vice president of customer segments. The irony of hiring a Best Buy executive who then failed to execute a Best Buy-style turnaround is not lost on analysts who covered the collapse.
During his 2-year run as CEO, Circuit City posted consecutive losses, withdrew full-year guidance twice, and watched same-store sales go negative. Activist investor Mark Wattles, who held a 6.5 percent stake, called Schoonover’s turnaround efforts “disastrous” in a letter to the board in April 2008 (NBC News, 2008). Schoonover resigned in September 2008, just 7 weeks before the bankruptcy filing.
The DIVX Disaster
Circuit City invested heavily in DIVX, a proprietary disc format that competed with DVD in the late 1990s. Consumers rejected it. Other electronics stores refused to stock DIVX movies. The format was abandoned after significant financial and reputational damage (Richmond Fed, 2013).
That failure had a lasting effect. It consumed capital and management attention during a period when Best Buy was quietly acquiring Geek Squad, expanding store formats, and building a service revenue line.
The Amazon Partnership That Helped the Wrong Company
In 2001, Circuit City formed a partnership to sell products through Amazon’s platform. On paper, it was a smart move into e-commerce. In practice, Amazon gained detailed intelligence about electronics retail operations and customer behavior. Circuit City gained minimal incremental revenue.
That knowledge helped Amazon sharpen its electronics category. Circuit City got nothing lasting from the arrangement and still had no meaningful standalone e-commerce infrastructure when the partnership ended (Gizoom, 2025).
| Decision | Year | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Exit appliance category | 1999-2000 | Lost profitable revenue stream to Home Depot/Lowe’s |
| DIVX format investment | 1998-1999 | Format failed, capital wasted |
| Amazon partnership | 2001 | Benefited Amazon more than Circuit City |
| Fire 3,400 workers | 2007 | Destroyed service quality, saved little |
How Did Circuit City Compare to Best Buy at the Time of Bankruptcy?
By fiscal 2008, Best Buy had grown to $40 billion in annual revenue, with 11 consecutive years of double-digit revenue growth (Best Buy SEC filing, 2008). Circuit City reported $11.6 billion in revenue the same year. That is a 3.4x gap between two companies that had been nearly identical in market share just 12 years earlier.
Each Best Buy location brought in roughly twice the revenue of a comparable Circuit City store, according to Bank of America analyst David Strasser (NBC News, 2007).
Store Count and Market Position
Best Buy’s U.S. market share reached nearly 21 percent in fiscal 2008, driven by the net addition of 137 new stores that year and comparable store sales growth of 1.9 percent domestically (Best Buy SEC filing, 2008).
Circuit City’s comparable store sales were negative. Its store count was shrinking, not growing. Best Buy was opening stores in Circuit City’s traditional strongholds, including California, Washington D.C., and Ohio, with a low-cost structure that Circuit City could not match in direct price competition.
Service Revenue Gap
Best Buy acquired Geek Squad in 2002 for a reported $3 million. That single acquisition gave Best Buy a recurring revenue stream through in-home installation, computer repair, and ongoing service contracts. By 2009, Geek Squad was operating across virtually all Best Buy locations nationally.
Circuit City launched its equivalent, Firedog, in 2007. That is 5 years behind Geek Squad. The brand had no meaningful customer recognition and never built the scale or trust that Geek Squad had accumulated.
E-Commerce and Online Presence
Best Buy’s total online revenue grew more than 25 percent in fiscal 2008, reflecting sustained investment in its digital channel (Best Buy SEC filing, 2008).
Circuit City’s online operation was underfunded and technically behind. The company had depended partly on its Amazon partnership rather than building its own platform, then found itself without a competitive digital presence when that relationship ended. No serious internal e-commerce capability existed at the point when online electronics retail was becoming essential.
What Happened to Circuit City’s Brand, Real Estate, and Assets After Closing?
The final Circuit City store closed on March 8, 2009. The liquidation eliminated more than 35,000 jobs and ended 60 years of retail operation under the brand name (Channel Insider, 2009).
Asset recovery happened through several separate channels. Systemax purchased the Circuit City brand name, trademarks, and CircuitCity.com domain at auction on May 13, 2009, for $14 million plus a revenue-sharing agreement over 30 months (CBS News, 2012).
What Became of the Brand Name
Systemax relaunched CircuitCity.com on May 22, 2009, as an online consumer electronics retailer. The site ran as a separate storefront alongside TigerDirect.com and CompUSA.com, all owned by Systemax, sharing the same product catalog.
In November 2012, Systemax consolidated all three brands under TigerDirect. The Circuit City name disappeared again after 63 years. Ronny Shmoel acquired the brand from Systemax in 2015 and relaunched Circuit City Corporation in 2016, with plans for retail kiosks and a social-focused e-commerce site. No significant brick-and-mortar presence materialized (Fortune, 2018).
Store Real Estate and Physical Assets
Liquidation managers Hilco Consumer Capital and Gordon Brothers Group ran the going-out-of-business sales across all 567 locations beginning in January 2009. Great American Group also participated in asset management.
Former Circuit City leases were absorbed by Best Buy, Target, and various regional retailers. Many locations became Best Buy stores, a fact that underlines just how completely Circuit City handed its physical footprint to its primary competitor.
InterTAN and the Canadian Operations
Circuit City’s Canadian subsidiary InterTAN was sold to Bell Canada separately from the main bankruptcy proceedings in 2009. This was one of the few asset sales that recovered meaningful value outside the U.S. liquidation process.
The Canadian sale demonstrated that parts of the business had standalone value, but the core U.S. retail operation was beyond saving. No integrated buyer emerged for the full company.
What Did Circuit City’s Collapse Mean for the Consumer Electronics Retail Industry?
Circuit City’s closure left Best Buy as the only national brick-and-mortar consumer electronics chain in the U.S. That shift was immediate and measurable. While the electronics industry as a whole saw sales decline by 10 percent in 2009, Best Buy’s sales dropped only 5 percent as Circuit City’s former customers transferred to them (Envzone, 2023).
Best Buy went from being the biggest of several national electronics chains to the only one left.
Amazon’s Acceleration Into the Vacuum
Amazon’s electronics category had already been growing before Circuit City closed. The collapse removed a major brick-and-mortar competitor and gave Amazon cleaner access to price-sensitive electronics buyers who no longer had a second physical option.
Amazon’s growth in Best Buy’s product categories was running at more than 50 percent annually by 2012, according to a Harvard Business School case study on Best Buy. The Circuit City closure accelerated the conditions that made Amazon’s electronics dominance possible.
What the Industry Learned
Three structural signals from Circuit City’s collapse:
- Mid-tier electronics retailers without differentiated service or digital infrastructure were not viable long-term
- Commission-free retail, pioneered by Best Buy, was the winning floor model for big-box electronics
- Treating experienced staff as a cost to cut, not an asset to retain, directly destroys the customer experience that justifies physical retail
Alan Wurtzel, son of the founder and former board member, was direct about what went wrong: “We thought we were smarter than anybody. But the time you get in trouble is when you think you know the answer” (Richmond Fed, 2013).
That observation applies beyond Circuit City. Retail collapses like Sears, Sports Authority, and others followed similar patterns: early success creating complacency, followed by slow adaptation, followed by a crisis that arrived too fast to outrun. Circuit City’s story is one of the clearest examples of how the gap between knowing what needs to change and actually doing it becomes fatal. If you want to see how other companies navigated these same pressures, the outcomes differ sharply between those that acted early and those that didn’t, as seen across a range of successful startups and digital-first brands that emerged to fill the gaps legacy retailers left behind.
The collapse of Sears followed a nearly identical arc, with the same failure to invest in digital, the same complacency about customer experience, and the same late-stage cost-cutting that accelerated rather than prevented the decline.
FAQ on What Happened To Circuit City
Why did Circuit City go out of business?
Circuit City failed due to compounding strategic mistakes over a decade. Exiting the appliance business, losing ground to Best Buy, firing experienced staff in 2007, and entering the 2008 financial crisis with weak cash reserves and broken vendor relationships made recovery impossible.
When did Circuit City close?
Circuit City filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on November 10, 2008. After failing to find a buyer during restructuring, the court approved full liquidation in January 2009. All 567 remaining stores closed permanently by March 8, 2009.
What happened to Circuit City employees?
The liquidation eliminated more than 35,000 jobs. Workers received severance based on bankruptcy proceedings. This followed the 2007 layoff of 3,400 experienced store employees who had been replaced with lower-paid, less experienced hires just two years earlier.
Who bought Circuit City after bankruptcy?
Systemax purchased the Circuit City brand name, trademarks, and CircuitCity.com domain for $14 million in May 2009. Systemax later merged the site into TigerDirect in 2012. Ronny Shmoel acquired the brand from Systemax in 2015 and relaunched Circuit City Corporation in 2016.
Did Circuit City and Best Buy compete directly?
Yes. For most of the 1990s, they were nearly equal in consumer electronics market share. Best Buy overtook Circuit City by 1996 and widened the gap steadily. By 2008, Best Buy’s revenue was $40 billion versus Circuit City’s $11.6 billion.
What was Circuit City’s biggest mistake?
Most analysts point to the 2007 decision to fire 3,400 of its highest-paid, most experienced store workers to cut costs. It destroyed customer service quality at the exact moment Circuit City needed to win back shoppers from Best Buy and online retailers.
Is Circuit City still in business?
The original retail chain is gone. Ronny Shmoel revived the brand as Circuit City Corporation in 2016 and operates a website. No large-scale brick-and-mortar stores have reopened. The brand today has no meaningful presence in consumer electronics retail.
How did the 2008 financial crisis affect Circuit City?
The recession accelerated a collapse already underway. Vendor credit tightened, making it impossible to stock shelves for the holiday season. Cash dropped from $297 million to $92 million in six months. Circuit City entered the crisis too financially weakened to absorb even a brief consumer spending drop.
Why did Circuit City stop selling appliances?
Management exited the appliance category in 1999 and 2000, framing it as a strategic focus on higher-margin electronics. In practice, it removed a profitable revenue stream worth hundreds of millions annually. Home Depot and Lowe’s absorbed that business and never gave it back.
What happened to Circuit City store locations?
Lease rights were absorbed by Best Buy, Target, and regional retailers after liquidation. Many former Circuit City buildings became Best Buy stores directly. Liquidation sales were managed by Hilco Consumer Capital and Gordon Brothers Group starting in January 2009.
Conclusion
This conclusion is for an article presenting the full arc of Circuit City’s rise and collapse as a consumer electronics retailer.
The store liquidation in 2009 did not come out of nowhere. It was the result of a decade of complacency, poor executive decisions, and a failure to respond to Best Buy’s expanding market dominance and Amazon’s growing online footprint.
Firing experienced staff, abandoning the appliance category, and ignoring e-commerce investment left the company with no competitive edge when the 2008 financial crisis hit.
What remains is a brand name that changed hands multiple times and a cautionary story about how brick-and-mortar retail collapses when adaptation stops. The Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing was not the cause of Circuit City’s failure. It was the result.
Many of his resources are available on various design marketplaces and for free on Codepen.
Over the years, he's worked with a range of clients and contributed to design publications like Design Your Way, Designmodo, WebDesignerDepot, WPDean, Speckyboy, and Slider Revolution among others.
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